Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

This book is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.

Author: John A. Nagl

Publisher:

ISBN: 0226567702

Category: Political Science

Page: 249

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Nagl considers the crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. This book is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.
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Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Examines the differences in the abilities of the British Army in Malaya and the United States Army in Vietnam to adapt their strategies when confronted with unexpected guerilla warfare.

Author: John A. Nagl

Publisher: Greenwood

ISBN: UOM:39015055870912

Category: History

Page: 249

View: 828

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Examines the differences in the abilities of the British Army in Malaya and the United States Army in Vietnam to adapt their strategies when confronted with unexpected guerilla warfare.
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Small Arms Survey 2010

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, revised edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nakamura, Akemi.

Author: Small Arms Survey

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 9780521197113

Category: Law

Page: 352

View: 799

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`As demonstrated in the Samll Arms Survey 2010, addressing the factors that trigger conflicts and fuel gang vioence has a much more lasting---and constructive---impact than simply incarcerating or marginalizing members of street gangs and armed groups.' Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime `The Small Arms Survey 2010 provides further evidence that efforts to address gangs and gangs violence must encompass a wide range of measures---including not only targeted law enforcement tactics and illicit gun interdiction, but also prevention and youth developemnt initiatives. In the long term, we must address the factors that lead young people to join gangs in the first place.' Director, Office of Gang Reduction asd Youth Developemnt, Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles `The Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Gums documents the scope, seriousness, and persistence of gangs and armed groups.' Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, Law, and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago The Small Arms Survey 2010 reviews a range of issues related to gangs and armed groups, focusing on their use of voilence, as well as emerging efforts to address the damage they inflict on socity. The volume includes studies of prison gangs, girls in gangs, and pro-government groups; it also features case studies from Ecuador and Southern Sudan. Rounding out the book is original research on the global ammunition trade and on options for controlling illicite firearm transfers by air. The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principle source of public information on all aspect of small arms and armed violence and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists.
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The Art of War in an Asymmetric World

1357159 john A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), ...

Author: Barry Scott Zellen

Publisher: A&C Black

ISBN: 9781441195555

Category: Political Science

Page: 345

View: 621

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This book examines the post Cold War security environment and how the U.S. has learned to wage war in this complex assymetrical world of conflict.
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Armed Forces and Insurgents in Modern Asia

16 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 117. 17 Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 17, 27–28, 33. 18 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p.

Author: Kaushik Roy

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 9781317231936

Category: History

Page: 246

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This volume traces the historical roots and evolution of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in modern Asia. Focusing on armed rebellions and use of armed forces by both Western powers and indigenous states from the nineteenth century till present day, the volume unravels the problematic of change–continuity and addresses key questions on the nature of warfare. The book looks at eight different regions of Asia: US counter-insurgencies in Philippines; the British initiative in Indonesia and independent Indonesia’s counter-insurgency against its domestic populace; post-World War II Malaya; French and US war in Vietnam; British and Indian counter-insurgencies in North-East India between the nineteenth and early twenty-first century; Indian and Sri Lankan operations in Sri Lanka during late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; British and US-NATO war in Afghanistan from the nineteenth century till 2014; and British and US counter-insurgency in Iraq during the twentieth and first two decades of the twenty-first centuries. The volume will greatly interest scholars and researchers of modern Asian history, military and strategic studies, politics and international relations as well as government institutions and think-tanks.
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How Wars are Won and Lost

Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. 134. As quoted in Newsweek, June 6, 1983, and cited in Cohen, “Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars,” 181 ...

Author: John A. Gentry

Publisher: ABC-CLIO

ISBN: 9780313395826

Category: History

Page: 314

View: 804

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Interviews and data drawn from the author's personal experiences as a U.S. Army officer Six case study chapters on U.S. conflicts where military superiority alone was not the decisive factor in the outcome (the Philippines, World War II, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan)
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The Counter Insurgency Myth

164. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 100. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 513. Quoted in Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 93.

Author: Andrew Mumford

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 9781136649387

Category: Political Science

Page: 216

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This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military’s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general.
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Boots on the Ground

17–18, cited in Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 75. 25. Bill Greer, letter, Asian Affairs. 26. John Loch, My First Alphabet, IWM 95/19/1. 27.

Author: Richard Dannatt

Publisher: Profile Books

ISBN: 9781782831235

Category: History

Page: 329

View: 699

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On Lneberg Heath in 1945, the German High Command surrendered to Field Marshall Montgomery; in 2015, seventy years after this historic triumph, the last units of the British Army finally left their garrisons next to Lneberg Heath. Boots on the Ground is the story of those years, following the British Army against the backdrop of Britain's shifting security and defence policies. From the decolonisation of India to the two invasions of Iraq, and, of course, Ireland, the book tracks the key historical conflicts, both big and small, of Britain's transformation from a leading nation with some 2 million troops in 1945, to a significantly reduced place on the world stage and fewer than 82,000 troops in 2015. Despite this apparent de-escalation, at no point since WWII has Britain not had 'boots on the ground' - and with the current tensions in the Middle East, and the rise of terrorism, this situation is unlikely to change. Sir Richard Dannatt brings forty years of military service, including as Chief of Staff, to tell the fascinating story of how the British Army has shaped, and been shaped by, world events from the Cold War to the Good Friday Agreement. Whether examining the fallout of empire in the insurgencies of Kenya and Indonesia, the politically fraught battle for the Falklands, the long-standing conflict in Ireland or Britain's relationship with NATO and experience of fighting with - or for - America, Dannatt examines the complexity of perhaps the greatest British institution.
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Special Warfare

BOOK REVIEWS FOREWORD BY GENERAL PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Learning to Eat Soup with a knife Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam JOHN A. NA GL WITH ...

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: UOM:39015083724065

Category: Military art and science

Page:

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Learning to Forget

Iohn Nagl, Learning to EatSoup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessonsfrom Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 71.

Author: David Fitzgerald

Publisher: Stanford University Press

ISBN: 9780804786423

Category: Political Science

Page: 304

View: 787

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Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.
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The Insurgents

the ability to learn to deal with messy, uncomfortable situations”—an ... title he emblazoned on his own book's cover was Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.

Author: Fred Kaplan

Publisher: Simon and Schuster

ISBN: 9781451642667

Category: History

Page: 432

View: 495

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A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who—against fierce resistance from within their own ranks—changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars. The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.
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Beating Goliath

Quoted in Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 157. For an early and well-informed if hardly dispassionate account of the Marine Corps' CAP program in ...

Author: Jeffrey Record

Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc.

ISBN: 9781597970907

Category: History

Page: 180

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An urgently needed analysis of why great powers lose asymmetrical wars
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Assembly

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaysia and Vietnam : Learning to Eat Soup with a knife . By MAJ John A. Nagl ' 88. Praeger . Westport , CT . 2002.

Author: United States Military Academy. Association of Graduates

Publisher:

ISBN: WISC:89102883444

Category:

Page:

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Military Law Review

His analogy would be equally apt to describe COIN efforts , which have been described as “ learning to eat soup with a knife .

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: STANFORD:36105134302434

Category: Courts-martial and courts of inquiry

Page:

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Knife Fights

Learning. to. Eat. Soup. with. a. Knife. A. Counterinsurgent. at. Oxford. and. West. Point. R. eturning to Oxford was a gift; in fact, Susi gave me a copy ...

Author: John A. Nagl

Publisher: Penguin

ISBN: 9780698176355

Category: Biography & Autobiography

Page: 288

View: 248

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From one of the most important army officers of his generation, a memoir of the revolution in warfare he helped lead, in combat and in Washington When John Nagl was an army tank commander in the first Gulf War of 1991, fresh out of West Point and Oxford, he could already see that America’s military superiority meant that the age of conventional combat was nearing an end. Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. But that made him an outsider within the army; and as if to double down on his dissidence, he scorned the conventional path to a general’s stars and got the military to send him back to Oxford to study the history of counterinsurgency in earnest, searching for guideposts for America. The result would become the bible of the counterinsurgency movement, a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. But it would take the events of 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give counterinsurgency urgent contemporary relevance. John Nagl’s ideas finally met their war. But even as his book began ricocheting around the Pentagon, Nagl, now operations officer of a tank battalion of the 1st Infantry Division, deployed to a particularly unsettled quadrant of Iraq. Here theory met practice, violently. No one knew how messy even the most successful counterinsurgency campaign is better than Nagl, and his experience in Anbar Province cemented his view. After a year’s hard fighting, Nagl was sent to the Pentagon to work for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, where he was tapped by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new army and marine counterinsurgency field manual, rewriting core army doctrine in the middle of two bloody land wars and helping the new ideas win acceptance in one of the planet’s most conservative bureaucracies. That doctrine changed the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Nagl is not blind to the costs or consequences of counterinsurgency, a policy he compared to “eating soup with a knife.” The men who died under his command in Iraq will haunt him to his grave. When it comes to war, there are only bad choices; the question is only which ones are better and which worse. Nagl’s memoir is a profound education in modern war—in theory, in practice, and in the often tortured relationship between the two. It is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.
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Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin

Rather than learning to eat soup with a knife , we must learn , through training not always win allies , treating them poorly will certainly and experience ...

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: NWU:35556028730158

Category: Military intelligence

Page:

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War and Media Operations

J.A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, New York: Praeger, 2002. 38 Downie's approach illustrates ...

Author: Thomas Rid

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 9781134116867

Category: History

Page: 240

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This is the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam. In late summer 2002, the Pentagon considered giving the press an inside view of the upcoming invasion of Iraq. The decision was surprising, and the innovative "embedded media program" itself received intense coverage in the media. Its critics argued that the program was simply a new and sophisticated form of propaganda. Their implicit assumption was that the Pentagon had become better at its news management and had learned to co-opt the media. This new book tests this assumption, introducing a model of organizational learning and redraws the US military’s cumbersome learning curve in public affairs from Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, the Balkans to Afghanistan, examining whether past lessons were implemented in Iraq in 2003. Thomas Rid argues that while the US armed forces have improved their press operations, America’s military is still one step behind fast-learning and media-savvy global terrorist organizations. War and Media Operations will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, media and war, propaganda, political communications and military studies in general.
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The Test of Terrorism

John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Janine ...

Author: Alastair Finlan

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 9781317653363

Category: History

Page: 116

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This book offers a timely and critical reflection on how states have responded to the test of terrorism in the long shadow of 9/11. Terrorism has become the hallmark of international relations in the early twenty-first century. This book provides a policy-focused analysis of how certain states have responded to its test by employing a range of viewpoints that encompass state level responses down to a close interrogation of the nebulous non-state actors who have orchestrated spectacular political violence in contemporary times. It engages with the challenges of terrorism from a variety of perspectives that include philosophical discourses, the perils of counterterrorism encapsulated in the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, learning in counterinsurgency, the effectiveness of counterterrorism spending, Al Qaeda’s modus operandi and the threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigeria. This eclectic collection of chapters is an important contribution to the wide-ranging and contested debate about terrorism that has dominated the political discourse in the West since 2001. This book was published as a special issue of Defense and Security Analysis.
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