Taxes Tariffs and the Global Corporation

In this paper we develop some simple models of optimal tax and tariff policy in the presence of global corporations that operate in an imperfectly competitive environment.

Author: James Levinsohn

Publisher:

ISBN: UCSD:31822015602576

Category: Finance, Public

Page: 22

View: 196

Download →

In this paper we develop some simple models of optimal tax and tariff policy in the presence of global corporations that operate in an imperfectly competitive environment. The models emphasize two important differences in the practical application of tax and tariff policy - tax, but not tariff, policy can apply to offshore output and tariff, but not tax, policy can be industry-specific. Recognizing the multinationals' production decisions are endogenous to the tax and tariff policies they face, we investigate optimal tax or subsidy policies for domestically owned firms and optimal trade policy.
Posted in:

How Should Tariffs be Structured

Author: Arvind Panagariya

Publisher: World Bank Publications

ISBN:

Category: Developing countries

Page: 29

View: 169

Download →

Should all imports be taxed at uniform rates? Should intermediate inputs be subject to import duties? If so, should duty drawbacks play a role in exports?
Posted in:

Energy Prices Tariffs Taxes and Subsidies in Ukraine

The problem seems even more serious in district heating and nuclear power. According to the Ministry of Construction, district heating tariffs, on average, cover about 80% of costs.

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:727204810

Category:

Page:

View: 694

Download →

For many years, electricity, gas and district heating tariffs for residential consumers were very low in Ukraine; until recently, they were even lower than in neighbouring countries such as Russia. The increases in gas and electricity tariffs, implemented in 2006, are an important step toward sustainable pricing levels; however, electricity and natural gas (especially for households) are still priced below the long-run marginal cost. The problem seems even more serious in district heating and nuclear power. According to the Ministry of Construction, district heating tariffs, on average, cover about 80% of costs. Current electricity prices do not fully include the capital costs of power stations, which are particularly high for nuclear power. Although the tariff for nuclear electricity generation includes a small decommissioning charge, it has not been sufficient to accumulate necessary funds for nuclear plants decommissioning.
Posted in:

International Trade Subsidy Rules and Tax and Financial Export Incentives

International Trade Subsidy Rules and Tax and Financial Export Incentives is an inquiry into the interrelations between international trade subsidy rules and the use of tax and financial export incentives by developing countries.

Author: Paulo Penteado Neto

Publisher: AuthorHouse

ISBN: 9781467054560

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 216

View: 242

Download →

International Trade Subsidy Rules and Tax and Financial Export Incentives is an inquiry into the interrelations between international trade subsidy rules and the use of tax and financial export incentives by developing countries. Its central claim is that developing countries should be allowed to adopt - based on their right to development - certain such incentives without violating the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules concerning subsidies. It advances the idea that the right to development of developing and least-developed countries (LDCs) entitles them to use tax and financial export incentives vis-à-vis comparatively more developed nations. However, in order to actualize this right, the existing WTO regulations must go through a process of revision. This process should craft an exception, available exclusively to developing countries and LDCs, allowing them to apply fiscal and financial export incentives against countries with a higher level of development, without being accused of granting prohibited subsidies. As a result of this policy reform, the WTO itself would incorporate development and fair/just trade concerns into its regulatory framework, providing an exceptional treatment for a patently exceptional situation. In doing so, the WTO would be contributing to a more equal international trade scene and a more developed and freer world.
Posted in:

Tax Competition and Trade Protection

This paper reconsiders the question of whether tax competition for mobile capital leads to tax rates on capital that are too low or too high from the combined viewpoint of the competing regions (or countries in an economic union).

Author: Eckhard Janeba

Publisher:

ISBN: UCSD:31822028497576

Category: Capital levy

Page: 23

View: 252

Download →

This paper reconsiders the question of whether tax competition for mobile capital leads to tax rates on capital that are too low or too high from the combined viewpoint of the competing regions (or countries in an economic union). In contrast to standard models of tax competition, both commodity trade and capital mobility is allowed to occur between the competing regions and the rest of the world. A key result of the analysis is that whether the capital taxes are too low or high depends on the degree of external trade protection. When the country's central government is free to set the tariff, tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates. But in the absence of a tariff, tax rates can be too high. In particular, regions may choose to subsidize capital in equilibrium as a means of inducing favorable terms-of-trade effects, but the subsidy (i.e., a negative tax) will then be too low because an increase in a single region's subsidy benefits other regions by reducing their relative quantities of subsidized capital. These results are discussed in the context of the European Union's Single Market, where non-EU firms have responded to the 'Fortress of Europe' by increasing foreign direct investment.
Posted in: